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How  financial innovation  and  financial intenmediaries  affect the
Federal  Reservers  abiljty  to target the monetary  aggregates  and,/or  interest
rates has  been  a long standjng  debate  in macroeconomics.  \,{ith  the recent
development  of new  money  market  instruments  and  the growth  of money  market
funds  this  issue is again  being  discussed. This article  develops  a model
of the financial sector to examine  how  the growth  in money  market  funds  has
altered the effectiveness  of monetary  policy.  The  work  presented  in this
paper  differs  fnom  previous  work in that the important  actors in the model
are specified  from  first  principles_  The  majon  conclusjon  reached  is that,
when  an explicit  role for the intermediary  is  specified, Lhe  asset  choice
of the money  market  fund is the key  var.jable  in determining  the
effecti veness  of monetary  po1  i  cy.1. Introduction
How  financial innovation  and  financial intermediaries  affect the
Federal  Reserve's  ability  to target the monetary  aggregates  and,/or  interest
rates has  been  a long standing  debate  in macroeconomics  beginning  wjth
Gurley  and  Shaw  (1955)  and  Tobin  and  Brainard  (1963).  |llith  the recent
development  of new  money  market  instruments  and  the growth  of money  market
funds  thjs  issue is again  being  discussed. The  concer"n  centers  around
three specific points:  how  the development  of new  instruments  which  are
components  of f41  (NOW  Accounts)  as well as those  which  are components  of l'|2
(Money  l4arket  Funds)  have  altered the demand  for l'11;  how  deregulation  of
deposit interest rates has  altered l'11  demand;  and  finally  whether  or not
the growth  of money  market  funds  has  diminished  the effectiveness  of
monetary  policy in the sense  that a given action by the Federal  Reserve
would  have  less impact  on the variables  being  targeted.  Although  these
three issues  are closely related, the purpose  of th.i  s paper  is to focus
narrowly  on how  the growth  in money  market  funds  has impacLed  the
effectiveness  of monetary  pol  icy.
The  idea that money  mar"ket  funds  lead to less effective monetary
control has  caused  some  to argue  that reserve  requi  rements  should  be placeo
on them  (see  Discussion  after Hester  1981).  These  arguments  are not unljke
those  given in the late 1950rs  and  early 1960rs  when  economists  were
concerned  about  how  institutions  such  as Savings  and  Loans  and  Mutual
Savings  Banks  altered monet.ary  policy.  Brainard  (1964)  included  nonbank
financial intermediaries  in a model  of the financial sector  and  examined
the size of the interest rate change  for a given open  market  operatjonL
with and  without nonbank  instjtutions.  He  conc'l  uded  that a gjven  open
marKet  operation  has  a smaller  effect on jnterest rates in the presence  of
financial intermediaries  than  wjthout them. More  recently, Wood  (1981)
argued  that Brainard's  model  was  incorrect because  it  misspecified  nonbank
financial intermediaries: sjnce  the development  of intermediaries  impnoves
market  efficiency (decreases  market  segmentation),  a model  that
incorporates  that improved  efficiency has  to be specified.  Wood
constructed  a mode'l  in which  there were  two sets of individuals and  two
types  of securities.  Each  set of indivjduals had  access  to only one  bond
market.  The  inclusion of financial intermediaries  then alIowed  the
jndjviduals access  to both security markets  through  the jntermedjary. In
this  example  the model  with the intermediary  produced  open  market
operat.ions  with larger effects on interest rates, thus contradicting
Erai  nard'  s resul  t.  Wood  concl  uded  that the Federa  l  Reserve'  s concern  over
the development  and  growth  of nonbank  intermediaries  was  therefore
unwarranted.
Woodrs  idea that fjnancial intermediaries  should  be specified  to
represent  a decrease  in market  segmentation  is an important  one, but there
are three potenlial problems  with this  approach. First,  it  is not obvious
what  particular institution  his intermediary  represents  (or,  in fact,  that
such  an institution  presently  exists).  Second,  the jntermediary  is not
specified as exhibiting optimizing  behavior.  Final  ly,  bank  behavior,  in
addition to the intermediary,  is not 'i  ncluded  in the model.
To  exam.ine  the effect on  Wood's  results of taking Lhese  criticisms jnto
account,  the model  developed  in this paper  consists  of a banking  sector, aJ
househo'ld  sector, a business  sector and  a government  securities market.
The  household  sector consists of two subsectors--i  and  j,  Sector  i
consists  of indivjduals only able to hold demand  deposits  while sector j
consists  of individuals who  hold demand  deposits  and  government  securities.
A nonbank  fjnancial intermediary  js then added  to represent  Money  Market
Funds  (hereafter Ml,4F)  and  individuals in sector i  may  hold government
securitjes indirectly  through  the Mt'1F.  The  major  conclus.ion  reached  is
that, when  an expijcit  role for the intermediary  is  specified, the asset
choice  by the MMF  is the key  variable in determining  the effectiveness  of
monetary  pol  icy.  Specifically, when  the money  market  fund holds  a
nontrivial  amount  of assets  in investments  which  have  a higher  ri sk and
yield a higher  return than government  secu[jties, the effectiveness  of
monetary  po1  i  cy i  ncrease5.  !/
2. Model  lriithout  a Nonbank  Financ'ia'l  Intermediary
This section  specifies the behavior  of the household  sector, the firm
sector, the government  securities market  and  the banking  sector.  The
comparative  statics of an open  mafket  operat.ion  is then calculated  and  w.i  ll
be compared,  in Section  3, to the results of the same  expe[iment  when  the
model  is extended  Lo include  a money  market  fund.
Househol  ds
For tractabi  1  i  ty,
behavi  or such  that the
the analysis  assumes  a separabil  ity  in household
decjsion  regarding  the allocation of current income+
to consumption  and  saving  is made  prjor to the decjsion  to allocate the sum
of initial  wealth  and  current saving  among  various  financial assets.  The
primary  household  decision  represented  here  is the al  iocation  of financiai
wealth  among  demand  deposits, government  secunities  and  holdings  of the net
worth of the banking  system.
Household  subsector  i  possesses  a fraction,  k, (0 s k < 1), of the
wealth  and  income  jn the economy,  and  is on'ly  able to hold  demand  deposits.
This is because  the minimum  denomination  of a Treasury  security is 10,000
dollars and  it  is assumed  Lhat no individual in sector i  possesses  enough
financial wealth  to invest in these  large denomination  securities.
Therefore,  in the absence  of a money  market  fund, sector i  is  limited to
holding  demand  deposfts.  Households  in sector  j  possess  the remainder  of
the wealth  and  income,  (i  -  k)|./  and  (1 -  k)y respectively, and  divide it
between  demand  deposits, government  securities and  ho)dings  of the bank's
net worth.  In other words,  sector j  may  be viewed  as the wealthy  sector
which  has  access  to the government  securities market.
By  assumption  the demand  for government  securjties is  positively
related to its  own  nate of return, inversely related to the rate of return
on dernand  deposits,  and  positively related to wealth  and  jncome.
Specifical'ly, the demand  function for government  securitjes (on the parL  of
subsector  j)  is gi  ven  by
sh
#  = K(R",R",(1-k)l./.(1-k)ov) ,.S
where
(1)5
W = initial  stock  of financial wealth, exogenously  g.iven
Sn  = household  holdings  of government  secunities  (number  of
consol  s payi  ng  g1/yr.  i  n perpetu  ity)
R, = rate of return on government  securjties
RO  = interest rate pajd on  demand  deposits, exogenously  seL  at the
bi  ndi  ng constraint
y  = nominal  aggregate  income,  assumed  Lo be exogenously  given
6  = proportion  of nominal  income  held as financial wealth
(  current savi  ngs).
Subsector  jrs  demand  function for deposits, Dnr, is then equal  to the
remainder  of this  sectorrs  wealth:
Dnr=  (l-k)!/  +  (l-k)oy - 
t
whe  re
N  = the initial  net worth  of the banking  system,  exogenousiy
given.
A1  so Kr:  aK,/aRS  '  0, K2  ;  6K/aRg  , 0, K3  = aK/a(1-k)W,0,
K4  = 6K/a(1-k)6y' 0.  Finally it  is assumed  that household  subsector  j
hoids  positive amounts  of both  demand  deposits  and  government  securities.?/
With regard  to household  subsecLor  i,  its  holdings  of demand  deposits
are equal  to its  entire financial wealth,
Dn-=k!r/+96y.6
Therefore  total  household  demand  deposits, Dn, are the sum  of demand
deposits  held by subsector  i  and  subsector  j:
fl  =O  +n -h  "hi  "hj
= khi  + k6y  + (1-k)|d  + (1-k)6y -  tt -  St.
Rs
= w  + 6Y  - tt  - sh.
R:
J
Non-fi  nanci  a  l  Fi  rms
Turning  to the specification of the firm sector, firms demand  loans  and
deposit the proceeds  in the bank.  Loan  demand  is assumed  to depend  on the
'interest nate on loans  and  on aggregate  income:
AA
L" = L-(R,  ,v)  (3) '  L  -'
A
'f  = L-  (4)
where
A
L- = firms'  loan  demand
R, = tne interest rate on business  loans
L
Dr = fi rmr  s hol  di  ngs  of demand  deposits
I
and
d  d  A  d  '2/
L; = aL"/aRL  ( 0  L) = aL"/ay'  0."
Government  Securi  ti es lvlarket
The  stock of government  seculities is determined  by the size of the
government  debt and  is assumed  to be exogenously  given.  Thjs stock  of
secur.ities  is  held by households  in the amount  Sn  and  bV  the banking  system7
in the amount  So.  Further, although  the Central  Bank  is not expl.icitly ri
mode)ed,  presumably  it  affects the supply  of government  securities
available for purchase. When  the Treasury  issues  securities, the Central
Bank  purchases  its  desired  amount,  leaving  the remaining  securities for the
public and  the banking  system. S as used  .i  n the model  is this  net si,ock  of
government  securi  ti es.
The  Bankinq  Secto  r
The  last  sector  to be specified is the banking  sector.  This model  of
the banking  firm is viewed  as representing  tne DanKing  system. A bank  js
assumed  to maximize  its  profits  and  to operate  in perfectly competitive
loan  and  security markets. in the deposit  market  it  is assumed  that banks
must  pay  a fixed rate on demand  deposits.  With the household  sector
choosing  to hold a portion of its  wealth  as demand  deposits,  the bank  can
then choose  to supply  loans,  earning  a rate of return Rr, or.it  can  choose
lo hold government  securities, earning  a rate of return Rr.
Loans  issued  to firms are assumed  to remain  within the banking
System  so lhat the balan"" <haai  i.lonti+\,  in:  r-account  framework  is
Reserves
Securities
Tota  I demand  deposi  ts







Net Worthwhe  re
R  = ban  k reserves
S, = number  of government  securities held by the bank  (number  of
consol  s payi  ng  g1/yr. i  n perpetui  ty)
L  = loans  to the business  sector
N  = nel worth  of banking  system,  assumed  constant.
Total demand  deposits,  D, can  be  written as
D  = D, + D-.
NI (6)
Fina11y,  there is an exogenous  reserve  requirement,  p. on the bank's
holdings  of demand  deposits  which  requires  that.
pD<R  (7)
where
0 ( p S 1.
The  Bank's  Objective  Function. The  bank  determines  its  loan supply
function and  its  securiLies  demand  function by maximizing  profits with
respect  l0  its  cho'ice  variables, L and  Sr.  The  objective function is





n  = Rs(t) +  \(L)(I+RL)L  - L  - c(L)  - RoDr,' (8)I
The  functjon I(L)  reflects the fact that a certain portion of the bank's
1oans,  (1 -  I),  will  default.  The  non-default  rare, I,  is assumed  ro be a
non-increasing  function of loans  such  that
r'(L) < 0, 0  <  r(L) < t. and
C(L) is  the cost of issuing and  servicing loans  and  it.i  s assumed  that this
cost increases  as the amount  of loans jncreases  and  at a nondecreasing  rat.e
so that Cr > 0 and  Crr  > 0.
Note  that  in fact (7) can  be rewrjtten as an equality:  suppose  p0,  R,
given  D, N and  L.  Then,  from  (5)
5.
R=D+N-L-J ''s
and  the bank  can  continue  to sati  sfy jts  balance  sheet  constraint and
reserve  requirement  by using  jts  excess  reserves  to purchase  government
securjtjes.  ll{ith  Rc'0  this would  increase  bank  profit,s.  Hence  the bank
J
(i.e.  the banking  syste6){/ will  always  have  an incentive Lo sati  sfy the
reserve  requirement  as an equality.  Equation  (7) can  lhen be  written
pD  = R. (7',  )
lvloreover,  in this model  , there would  be no reason  for anyone--either
households  or banks--to  hold government  securities if  RO  were  greater  than
q/
RS.=  Thus  R,  > RO  must  c'tdracrerize  the equil  ibrium.
Further,  from  the bank's  point of view  (6) can  always  be  written  as
D  = Dn  + L.  (6')
Then  (7') and  (6')  imply  that (5) can  be  wrjtten as0r
c
O!*of=(1-p)0.+N. ''s
Substit.uting  (6')  and  (5')  into the profit  function for D and  SB,
RS
l+pRc+Cl
(1+RL)  = (\IdDS
(0, (]( 1-p)D^  - N)). 'p  n
Further, to guarantee  a maximum  solution, it  is assumed  that
respectively, the objective function contains  explicitly  the single
decision  variable, L.  It  js assumed  that the optimal Ioan  supply  curve  is
determined  from  the first  order condit.ion
:i 




That is,  the fifst  order condition is  satisf  .ied  for  some  value  of L in the
open  i  nterval11
2
dn " " = (1+R  )(2)r+LI") - C',,  0.
tl
dL'
Finally,  from (9),  the loan supply function can be written
Ls = LS(R".R,  )  (9') .  5  L'
where
Ll = aLs,zaR-,0  tS=^rsu^o  ,16r
-t  5 
'  t2  =  dL  /d^L  u  -
The  bankrs  demand  curve  for government  securities is then
s.
DD 
=  (  l-e)Dh  -  pLs + N.
J
It  is useful, aL this point, to examine  the relationship among  Rr, R,
and  RD. Since  the economics  of the problem  requires  RL  t 0,  it  must  be
that 1+RL  ) 0.  Equation  (9) then implies  that
l+pRS+Cl
>0
(  x(  L)+LI  |  )
and  since  the numerator  of the fractjon above  is clear'ly  positive, it  must
be that
l(L)  + 11  r(L) '  0.12
But even  thjs  is not sufficient to characterize  the equilibrium.  Consider,
for example,  the speciai  case  C'=  l'  = 0, I = 1.  Then.  at the optjmal  L,
(9) implies that R, = eRg. This result cannot  be taken  seriously, however,
because  it  implies RL,RS  in equilibrium.  If  RL  ( RS  Lhe  last dollar a
bank  has jnvested  in loans  could  be shifted to the government  securi  ties
market  with a resulting 'increase  in bank  profits.  With loans  being  subject
to direct costs and  a default risk,  the representative  bank  would  close its
loan department  unless  RL  ,  RS. The  equal  ity  RL  = pR,  can  be understood
from  the perspective  of the banking  system  since, from  (5r),  a fully  loaned
up system  can  acquire  only p in government  securities for each  $1 of  ioans
not made. But no individual bank  will  loan out $1 unless  RL,  RS. The
economjcs  of the problem  thus requires  that RL  exceed  Rr, so that the three
rates involved  in thjs  anaiysis  must  satisfy the re'lation
RL'RS>RD.
As a more  real  i  stic  exampl  e,
and  0 { T(  1.  Then  with C' = 0
optimal L sati  sfies
1+pR. 'J
suppose  that \ =T,  where  T  is a constant
and  tr' = 0 equation  (9) implies that the
1 + R, 
-
L
For R, = .05, p =






s0 that indeed  R,.  is greater  than Rr.  Further  for C' )0  and  I,L(0  the
case  becomes  even  stronger  that R, ) Rr.  Henceforth,  we  assume  that the
'internal  optimum  satisfies the economic  requirement  RL  t RS  > RD.
Equi  I  i  bni  um  Condjtions
Note  that the bank  determines  jts  demand  for government  securities, Sr,
and  the public determines  its  demand  for  securities, Sh.  In the loan
market,  firms have  a desired  demand  for 1oans,  Ld. and  banks  have  an
optimal loan suppiy  function, Ls.  These  two  markets,  the securities market
and  the loan market,  adjust simultaneously  to determjne  the equilibrium




L  -_L (11)
Before  turning to the examination  of an open  market  operat.ion,  it  is
worthwhi  le to summarize  the economics  of the entire model: individuals are
endowed  with an initial  financial wealth,  which  is divided between  demand
deposits, government  securities and  bank  net worth.  Banks  are endowed  with
an initial  net worth  and, given household  demand  deposits, banks  choose  ro
hold some  quantity of government  securities, earning  a rate of return RS,
and  to supply  loans  to firms, earning  a rate of reLurn  R,.  A certain
percentage  of loans  is  not repaid  and  that percentage  increases  wjth the
amount  of  loans  extended-  (Hence,  I,  which  is defined  as the percenlage
of  Ioans  which  are repaid, is a decreasing  function of loans).  Banks
-q14
choose  their  optimum  loan suppiy  curve  and  secunity  demand  curve  by
maximizing  profits  subject  to a balance  sheet  identity and  subject  to being
ful1y loaned  up.  In other words,  in this model  , banks  earn  maxjmum  profits
by holding  only enough  reserves  Lo cover  their  reserve  requirements.  Thus,
a bank  technically only chooses  its  loan suppiy  curve.  Its  demand  for
securities i  s residual  1y determined.
Viith  individuals and  banks  having  a demand  for  securities and  with a
fjxed supply  of securities, the jnterest rate on securities (Rr) adjusts to
equilibrate the demand  for and  supply  of securities (simu'i  taneously
determining  the equilibrium interest rate Rr).  Simjlarly in the loan
market,  the demand  for and  supply  of loans  equilibrate, determjning  the
market  clearing interest,  rate R,-.
The  Comparative  Statics of an 0pen  l,jarket  Operatjon
The  final  step in this  analysis  is to consjder  an increase  jn the
supply  of government  securilies with initial  wealth  held fixed.  In other
words,  suppose  there is an open  market  sale oi  secur  i!jes.  What  is the
effect on the equi'l  ibrium interest rates, R, and  Rr?  Th.is  result will  then
be compared  to the sane  experiment  when  the model  is extended  to include  a
money  market  fund.
In equilibrium  the 11  equations  which  make  up the system  recjuce,  via a
series of substitutions! to the two  market  clearing conditions,  (10) and
(11), defined  explicitty  as
RSK(RS,RD,(1-k)\t,(1-k)dv)  + pr111-p)D;1  -  pLs(RS,RL)  +N)=S  (10')15
ld{R'v) = Ls{n'nr).  (11,)
Totally differentiating  the two equilibrium  conditions  resuits in,
dRS,0
o5
dRt ,  n7/
is-
Further in this model  l"l1  is defined  as





dt4t  _  ,,  dRs  .  a  dRr  ^
;s=-Kr-ds.L;  d'o'
That is,  an jncrease  in the supply  of government  securi  t.jes  results in an
increase  in the equiljbrium interest rates and  a decline in the money
stock, as one  would  expect.
A useful characterization  of this  open  market  experiment  is the
following.  When  there is an increase  in the suppiy  of government
securities individuals jnitialiy  buy  them  at the exist.i  ng price.
Individuals then realize they are not at an optimal  position with the
resulting demand  deposit-security  combinatjon. As a result, the excess
suppiy  of securities is  sold causing  the price of securjties to fall  andlo
'interest  rates to rjse until  the economy  reaches  a new  equilibrium.  A1  so,
given that bank  reserves  are determined  by the amount  of household  demand
deposits, a deciine in deposits  means  an init.jal decline .in  reserves  of rhe
same  amo  unt.
3.  [4odel  with a Nonbank  Financial  jntermediary
In this  section  a financial intermediary  is added  to the model  and  the
comparative  statics of an open  market  operation  is compared  with the result
of Section  2.  The  nole of the intermediary  is to al  lov/  sector i  access to
the government  securitjes market.  Since  household  sector  j  can  already
hold government  securities, it  is assumed  that sector  j  contjnues  to
purchase  securities directly.  The  budget  constrajnt for householo  sector i
becomes
kw+k6v=0,.-tl. -  nt  h
where
1"1"  = deoosits in  lhe money  marker fund.
fl
The  households  demand  for these  deposits  is assumed  to be determined  by
l'ln  = Mn(  RO,  Rr.  k|,.i,  kdy  )  (14)
whe  re
R- = the interest  rate  pai.i on denosit< hcld at.  nroney  market funds m
and  lv1h1  = al'1h/aRD  '  0, Mhz  = a I'lh,/aRm  '  0,Mh3 = 0F1h/ak\{  '  0,





held  in banks  aredef  i  ned  as demand  depos  i  ts
Dti * Dhl
(z')
= (kW+k6v-t4n)  + (1-k)W  + (1-k)6y  - r - 
ln RS
c
=  trii  +  6y  -  N -  Mu - 
oI. "  ''s
Firm  behavior  and  Bank  behavior  do not change  ffom the specification of
Section  2 so it  remains  to specify the behavior  of the money  market  fund.
Money  Market  Fu  nd
A money  market  fund is a financjal intermediary  which  accepts  deposits
from  individuals (and  businesses)  and  earns  income  by managing  a bond
portfolio.  The  fund  also provides  its  depositors  access  to their deposits
through  some  form  of check-writing  priviiege and  is therefore, in many
ways,  similar to a bank.  The  growing  popularity of the Ml4F  is the source
of recent  inrerest in the cenLral  quesLion  of this  paper--the  effectiveness
of monetary  policy.  In actual  ity,  a money  market  fund is a special  case  of
a mutual  fund  and  the mutual  fund industry has  a much  longer  history.  In
fact,  it  is more  accurate  to think of the model  being  developed  here  as
representing  the behavior  of *,he  mutual  fund industry, including  l,4MFs,
since  the greater  degree  of l'iquidity characterist.ic  of an tlMF  is rarely
the issue  of critical  importance.  As  will  be seen,  a major  distjnction
between  an llMF  and  a bank  is that an  MMF  is  not required  to hold reserves
against its deposits.  And  thjs  is the case  for  non-MlvlF  mutual  funds  as
wel  l.18
The  modeling  of the representative  MMF  proceeds  as follows.  Household
sector i  determines  its  holdings  of deposits  in the 1"11,4F.  The  fund, in
turn, can  choose  between  holding  government  securities, earning  a rate of
return Rr, and  other investments  expected  to earn  a rate of return greater
than Rr.  These  othe.i nvestments  can  be thought  of as foreign securitjes
whose  higher return is accompanied  by a non-negligible  risk of default, or
as a portfolio  of corporate  bonds  and  other assets  sufficienLly diversified
as to minimize  risk but sti11 yielding a rate of retunn  generally  above  Rr.
In other words,  another  dist.inction  between  an  MMF  and  a bank  is the
former's abiliLy to diversify irs  investment  portfol  io more  widely  than is
the case  of a bank,  since  a bank  generally  operates  under  greater
geographic  and  regulatory  constraints.  Notationally, the model  uses  F, to
refer lo the l'lMF's  holdings  of these  other investments  and  RF  to refer to
their yieid,  thus suggesting  the.ir identity as fore.ign  securit.ies. But the
reader  should  keep  a broader  interpretation in mind.
In a T-account  framework  the balance  sheet  identity  for the money
markeL  fund i  s
Government
"ForeignI








RS F= m M,, n19
It  is assumed  that the l,4lvlF  is willing  to supply  ail  the deposits  demanded,
Mn,  at the interest rate Rr.  The  fund pays  at least the demand  deposit
interest rate, RD,  plus some  function of the differential  between  the
government  securityrs rate and  the demand  depos.it  interest rate.
Specifically R, is  specif.ied  as
Rr=RD+r(Rr-R'), (  15)
where  d is a decision  variable for the
assets  between  government  and  foreign
the amount  of deposits  held.in foreign
l'11'1F  . lVi  th the fund
ca.rrr'i I i  o<  tha  frrn;:l
securi  t  i  es so that
B/
(  16  )
and
( 1-p  )Mn  . (  17)
The  Ml,4Frs  Objective  Function. The  l,4MF  determines  the jnterest rate paid on
ils  deposits  and  the fraction of its  assets  held in fore.ign  securities by
maximizing  profits with respect  to  its  choice  variables, I  and  p.  The
objective function is  similar to the bankrs  objective function and  is
def  i  ned  as
Fr = PM"  '
dividing its






= Rs(4)  + r2(Fm)(1+RF)Fm  - Fm  - Rmr,th (18)ZA
Ir(Fr)  reflects the fact that a certain portion of the foreign securities
will  default.  I,  is assumed  to be a decreasing  function of these
securi  ti es so that
IZ'(F*)  ( 0  and  0sIZ(F')<1.
The  Ml'lF's  profits  are maximized  subject  to the constraints  (14), (15),
(16), and  (17).  Substituting  these  constraints  into the profit  function,
obtainjng  the first  order condiLions  and  solving the two  first  order
condjtions  for the optimal  values  of f  and  p results in
r = r(  RD,  RS,  RF)  (  19)
p = e(RD,RF)  (20)
where
,  0t  ,  0f  .  ar "1  =rRD'o  "2=\'o  "3=r*,'t]
p',  = ^lP  , o  o^  =  lP , n 'RD  -  '2-  oRF
Fina11y,  since  R* is defined  as
Rr=RD+r(RS-RO)









That js.  an increase  in RO  leads  the Ml'4F  to raise R, in order to remain
competitive  wjth banks,  while an increase  in either R, or R, leads  the fund
to increase  Rm  in order to attract more  deposits  with dhich it  can  jnvest.
Equi  I  ibri um  Conditions
In this version  of the model,  with the money  market  fund holding
g0vernment  securities, there is an additional demand  for  securit.ies. Thus
the equil  ibrium  condition  (10) becomes
-h  "B  "m
-r-=+i-=-
n.  11.  K^  x^
(2r)
and  the loan market  equilibrium  conditjon (11) does  not change.
Substituting the explicit  expressions  for each  of the functions  in (21) and
(11) the equilibrium  conditions  are:
RsK(  RS,RD,  (1-k)t,rl,(  1-k)oy)+R5(  (  t-n)Dn-eL'+N)  + RS(  t-p)Mi,  = s (21'  )
A
Lo(  RL.  y  ) = Ls(  R,,  RL)
The  Comparative  Statics of an 0pen  l"larket  0peration
(il')
The  model  now  consists  of the 11  equations  from  section  2 with (Z')
repiacing  (2) and  (21) replaclng  (10).  In addition the model  includes
equations  (14) thru (20), with the additional exogenous  variable,Rr, and
Lhe  additional endogenous  varjables, Mh,Rr,Fr,S*,p,and  {.22
Differentiating  the equilibri  um  conditions  (2i')  and  (11t)  with respect
to an  increase  in government  secur.ities  results  in:
dR.l  , dR. -iSlz 
;  as
dRr  I 
,dRr  , 
o,
il  , =  ,i  as  (p-P) =  0.!/
uLic  (  )
The  explanation  for thjs  result  is as follows:  the initial  increase  in
the suppiy  of government  securities rajses the interest paid on these
securities.  This leads  to a higher  interest rate paid on  MMF  deposits.
Wjth RD  fixed,  househoid  sector i  lowers  its  demand  deposit  accounts,  Dn.,  ,
and  .increases  its  holdings  of I4MF's,  Mn.  Hence  the bank  is forced  to
decrease  its  holdings  of government  securities S, while the !1lv1F  can
i  ncrease  its  holdings.  Sr.
Now,  due  to the expansionary  power  of the banking  system,  the bank  need
oniy iower  S, by (1-p) t,imes  the amounr  of decline in Dn.  Since  the l"lMF
holds  foreign securities in the amount  p, Sm  only r  ises by (1-p) times  the
amount  of  increase  in M".  (p-p)'0  implies that rhe amount  of decljne in n
SB  is  less than the jncreased  demand  Sr.  OveralI  the demand  for government
securities ri ses  due  to thi  s real  location.  Hence  the price of governmenr
secunities  falls  and  the interest rate rises by a smaller  degree  than in
the case  when  MMF's  donrt exist.  (p-p) , 0 results in the oppos.jte  story.
Given  that today  (since 1980)  the reserve  requi  rement  on demand  deposits  rs
396  for the first  925  million  in deposits and  7Z?i,  above  that amount,  p need
only be greater than .12 for the scenario  with (p-p) (0  to app1y. That23
is,  as long  as the percentage  of the l,4l'lFrs  assets  held in foreign (or
I'other")  bonds  is not negiigible, the presence  of nonbank  financjal
intermedjaries  leads  to largeLi nter  est rate effects for a given  open
market  ope  rat  i  on.
Finally in this  version  of the model
Ml =D=W+6y-N-K-Mh*Ld
so that
.tMl  dR.  ,  dR,  dR_ ur-l: =  -r  i  +  tu  ---!  -  u  I  ,  n
ds  ''1  ds  '1  ds  "h2  ds
For equal  intenest rate changes,  demand  deposits  fall  by a larger amount
than in the model  without the lv1flF.  This is because  the increase  in R,
leads  the MMF  to raise its  deposit  rate, Rr.  The  individuals in sector i
take a portjon of their  demands  deposits  out of the bank  and  put them  into
the fund so that bank  deposits  fall  by a larger amount  than in the case
without lhe fund.  For interest rate changes  that are larger than jn the
first  model  M1  falls  by more,  whereas  for  interest rate changes  that are
sma11en,  whether  1,41  fal ls by more  or 
'less 
depends  on the size of the
interest rate partial  lv1nr.  Note  also that in this model  1,42  is defined  as
A
t42=D+Mn=W+6y_N_K+1"
which  is exactly equal  to l'11  in the first  model. Thus  the condition  under
which  112  falls  by more  (or less) than  the original Ml is analogous  to
whether  the interest rates rise by more  (or less) than in the original
mode  I .24
Exp  lanati  on of Resul  ts
The  result of this  section  can  be understood  as a result of a change  in
the slope  of the bond  demand  curve  in RS-S  space. V/ith  an exogenous  supply
of securities, a less interest elastic demand  curve  implies  a larger
interest rate effect for a given jncrease  in securities.  This is the case
if  (p-p) ( 0.
Furthen  jn this  fixed price model  an,'LM  cunve,r  in RS-RL-y  space  can  be
derived  where
dR-l  , dR^ )t  5
dyl  2,  dy
dRr  | 
, dR,  , 
,n, ____:r  = _.  -.  (p_p)  =  0.!, dyl  2\  dy -- 
)
When  (p-p) ( 0 the bond  demand  curve  is  steeper  than in the case  without
the Ml'4F  and  the Ll"1  curve is also steeper.  This is because  a less interest
elastic bond  demand  curve  implies that for a given i  ncrease  in  income  a
larger increase  jn the interest rate is  needed  to reequil  ibrate the bond
market.  This in turn implies  less potenL  effects from  fiscal  policy and
more  potent effects from  monetary  po1icy.11/  Furrher  as Roth  (1985)
discussed  in his recent  artiale.  a steeper  Ll'l  curve  implies  more  inrerest
rate volatility  for a given  monetary  policy.  This results again  from  the
fact that for a given  change  in the money  supply  a larqer interest rate
change  is  needed  to reequilibrate the bond  market.  Finaily a steeper  LM
curve  implies a flatter  aggregate  demand  curve  in P-y space. The  flatter
the aggregate  demand  curve  the more  a disturbance  in aggregate  supply  will25
nesult in a change  in income  and  the less it  will  result in a change  in the
price leve1.  Perhaps  the analysis  of a steeper  Lf"1  curve  could  be an
explanation  for the volatile  interesL  rates experienced  dur  ing the early
1980's,  whjch  to date have  been  inclus.ively  stud.ied  (see  Antoncic  (19g6)i.
4.  Concl  usi  on
Using  a more  complete  model  of the financial sector and  focusing  on a
particular type of financial intermediary-mutual  funds, this  paper  supports
\,lood's  conclusion  that the existence  of nonbank  financial intermediaries
leads  to open  market  operations  with larger effects on interest rates than
in the case  when  these  inlermediaries  do not exist.  This conclusion
suggests  that the Federal  Reserve  should  not be concerned  with the
development  of this  particular nonbank  intermediary,  in the sense  that the
presence  of this  institution  does  not resulL in less effective monetary
policy.  Fina11y,  this  anaiysis  offers a possible  explanation  for the
vol  ati I  e i  nterest.  rates experi  enced  duri  ng the early 19g0r  s.1.
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FOOTNOTES
It  is jmportant  to keep  in mind  that this  paper  is concerned  only lvith
modeling  the fjnancial sector.  Hence  the results here  admittedly
represent  the partial  equilibrium  effect of changes  in the f  .inancial
sector.  How  these  resulting changes  affect the real sector, which  in
turn may  have  feedback  effects on the f  inancia'l  sector, is an
interesting avenue  for further research.
A careful discussjon  of the derivation of the functions  representjng
household  sector behavior  appears  .i  n Lown  (19S6).
Note  that equation  (4) is a simplification of a more  complete  firm
sector specification.  Accounting  for the firm sector's capitai stock
and  a1lowing  firms lo  issue securities their  budget  constraint is K  +
A.
Df = L" + S;  If  it  is assumed  that the securities issued  by the firms
exacr1y  support  the capital srock  (K = S;) we  are left  v/ith  equation
(4).
The  existence  of a Federal  Funds  lvlarket  permits  banks  to eliminate
excess  reserves  without the risk of violaljng the reserve  requirement.
Sjnce  borrowing  and  lending  on the Federal  Funds  Market  nets to zero
(by definition)  in the banking  system,  the Federal  Funds  Market  does
not appear]  n thi  s modeI  .
Households  would  still  choose  to hold demand  deposits  when  RS  ( RD  if
demand  deposits  provided  required Iiquidity  and,/or  some  households
simply  had  too l'ittle  wealth  to purchase  even  a single government  bond.





6.  Note  that the Ls function could  be augmented  to include shift
parameters  from  the cost and  non-defaujt  rate functions.  Additional
comparative  statics can  be examined  by including  these  shift
parameters.
7.  See  Appendix  A for a proof of this  result.
8.  In this  version  of the model  it  is assumed  that the l4MF  sets the rate
it  pays  on its  l iabilities.  Another  equally  p'l  ausible  assumption  would
be that Rm  is market  determined. This latter  case  is djscussed  in Lown
(  1e86).
,"I




with an  MMF)  to distinguish it  from  the dRS  al  ready  derived  for the
IS
model  without an l"1MF  and  similarly  for^  dRLl  The  proof of this  result
dsl  2
appears  in Appendi  x A.
10. See  Appendix  B for a proof of this  result.
11. A more  detaj  led examination  of the policy jssue  would  .involve  a
discussion  of anticjpated  and  unanticipated  effects which  is beyond  the
i  ntent of thi  s analysi  s.
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Appendi  x A
(12) and  (13), the equilibrium
to S:
condi  ti ons  are
(A.1)
R.pK,+pK+pN+(  1-o)(W+6v)-.r  t-^n  -  t  ! y  r  r''S  -1
-L-
1 ,.':':l  |fl [.]
r  zJ L---,_l
so that
dRs  _  (Li-+)
05  UN
o*r  =  'i.
dS  DN
DN  is the determinant  of the matrix on the left  hand  side of (A.l):
DN  = (  RrpKr+pK+pN+(  t-p  )(w+6y)  -p  Ls-pRs  Li  )(  L!-Lj  l-e  LiarLi
= (  RrcKr+pK+pN+(  1-p  )  (\,{+6y)-p  Lt;  1  L!-L!t-enrLlLl.
(A.2)
(A.3)
The  numerators  of (A.2) and  (A.3) are negative  and  to sign the denominator,
DN,  note !hat
S^
PK+pN+(  1-p)(W+dy)-pLs  = #  +
,'S
so that with RSpKI  ) 0, we  have
tn,
RsRreKl  + pK  + pN  + (1-p)(W+6y)  -  pLs  ,
Al  so si  nce
0.
rd-t  s,  n 'r -2
DN  is negative  so that (A.2) and
cnrL!Ll  , o,
(A.3) are positive.
To obtain the derjvatives (22) and  (23), (Zl' ) and  (11,) are
differentiated wilh respect  to S:
(  e-p)  [RrMnr(  r+r2(  Rs-RD)  )+Mh]+





dRs  _ L;-Li -d5  - -DE
dR,  L:





to  - ,-'i r!










DN,  = DN+(o-p  yIRst4h2({+r2(Rs-RD))*Mh](L?-L;).DN,  denotes  t,he  determinant  of equation  system  (A.4) while DN  is the
determinant  of equation  system  (A.1).
Note t hat
DN,  = 91,1  as (  p-p) = 0
so t  hat
dR.  I 
,dR*
rs-lz  . 
-aS
dR,  I 
'dR,  (
.rr-Ie  =  -- as (P-P)  = 6.
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At  |  .lp '"s  |  > *"s
ll?l
dy  t^  dy -z
dRr I  r  dRl
-l=-"r{p-p);0. oY 12  dY
(l-p)(W+6y-K)+N-ots-nroll+ox,  -nral!




- (  pRSK4+Rs  (  l-o )  6+n,  (  o-e)\n  )
-  (  oRrxn+R,  1  1-p  )  6+Rs  (  p-p  )  Mhn  I  t  lf-l!  i  -nror,llj
2  DN+(p-p)  (Rs\,zR  z*\) <r.!-r,ilel!- {  onrr**n,  (  t-p  )  6+Rs  (  p-plrqn  I  ll
DN+(p-p)  (RsMhrn  r*rxi <r,f-l!I
where
A =  - [ (  I-p)  (l.I+6y-K)  +N-pLs-Raoll+orr+  1p-p  ) (RS\2RmZ+\)  ]
AK
K  =->  n
ddy
al'l




























dR^  |  dR s  I  ---s
IO  Snow  - 
|
dv lz  dv
-  [oRrxn+n,  1  1-p  )  6+Rs  (  p-p)\n  t  r  r,!-li  I  -nrar,!l!
DN+  (  p-p)  tnrunrn*r*un  I  <  l!-ll  )
-(pRsK4+Rs  (  r-o  I  o  r  c  r,l-r,ll  -nrar,!ll
DN
note  that  (B.I)  can be rewritten  as
-DN  {  [pRsK  +Rs  (  r-p  )  6+p.  1  r-oloX,  t  <  lf-l]  I  -nrar.llll
< -DN  [  (  pRsKA+n,  (  r-p  )  6  )  {  ll-r,l I  .nrnr,!l! t
(B.2)
+  (  p-p  )  [RsMh2Rmr-rX  I  <  r,l-r,!  I [  -  (  onrxn*n,  1  r-p  I  s  I  1  r.f  -lj I  **rrtlrll  t .
Sinplifying  (  8.2  ) :
(8.1)-DNRS(p-p)Mh4<L!-r,il  < (p-p)  ["s\2"*z*\] <r,!-lll
.l  c  cn
./-^D  rr  -D  /1-^\1/r*  r"\ . \  -p5sA4-r(s (  r-p )  o\ ),:--L2)  -KSqL?t,2)
DMh4  .  [Rs\zRm2+Mh](  (pKn+(1-p)6r  <l!-lli*or,!ldi (8.3)
.lc
since  -(p-p)  (L:-L:  )>0. --LZ
Recal-L  from  Section  2  that
DN  =  [(R_rK_ + -!  +  tj. '-o  -s  -  -s-o' -J  ( iJ.t  -L? 
) 
-PKcL.t  L.t J
PD
DJ
so that  (8.3)  can be writtan
5.  S_
h  q  d  c  /qc
(R-pK,  +  --j:  +  --: ) (L:-L:)M  -  oR L-L"M '  s'  I  p  P 
'-L  -2'--h4  "-'s-r-1"h4
55
(B.4)
< (  (  pK.  +  (  I  -p  )  6  )  " d ' t '  ' s'  d"^  ''  -
* 
(Li-L;)+eL;L;')  (RsMnzR 
z'\).
Thus !t  remains to  be shown  that  the  inequatity  (B,4)  is  true.
It  is  clear  that
-h  -D
(R.oK,  + --  + --:)ML  r  >  (pK.+(1-p)6)  (R^M_^R  ^+M-)  (B.5)
>  r-  n4  4  5 nlmz  n
55
-h
since  j  *  "  t  Mx and q-,  >  pK.+(l-p)6
u  /l+  4l
r(^  K^It  could  be  the  case  that  pK1<\2Rm2  so  that  RSpKI <  RSMh2R*Z.  Yet
these latter  values are  smalL comparea  witn  I  *  I 
"na 
rq  so that  the
Rs  .Rs
inequality  (B.5) Ilolds,  Multiplyins  (B.5) by <r,!-lll.O  resufts  in
hB.l<.ls (RcpKr+--j:+--:)(L;-L;)M'.,  < (pK,+(I-6)p)(L;-L;)(R.i4-^R_^+M,).  (8.6) 's  !  z  3 nzmz  n
55
Finally,  it  is  true  that
d  c  crl -pR-Llllll-,  < pLIL](R-M,^R  -+M-)  (8.7)
5  r  J- n4  Z  Z  5  DZ  mZ  n
since  the  left  hand side  is  negative  and  the  right  hand  sj.de is
positive.  Surnning  (8.6)  and (B.?)  gives  us the  inequality  (8,4).